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ABSTRACT 
As a means by which actors justify beliefs and practices, rhetoric has a key 
institutional role. In contested settings, where multiple groups and the logics 
associated with them interact, research has highlighted rhetorical strategies that 
exploit rival systems. The account we develop expands on these ideas and suggests they 
embrace forms of counter-
rhetoric, or arguments that delegitimize a rival’s logic and refine and reframe others’ 
values. We use these categories to explore the case of a local mental health service, 
an area of health policy known for problematic diagnosis and treatment. Here groups 
of medical and social-care providers were required to work together in a system of 
intensive inter-professional relations and clashing logics. Our analysis focuses on this 
interaction, exploring the language-based nature of logics and sources of conflict between 
logics that are asserted in counter-rhetorical forms. 
KEYWORDS: Rhetoric; counter-rhetoric; institutional logics; mental health; health and 
social care integration 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study examines linguistic uses particularly rhetoric within an institutional approach. 
It links rhetoric with institutional logics or those constellations of values, beliefs and 
practice that organizational groups identify with and define their outlook (Loewenstein 
2014; Lok 2010). As a general observation, rhetoric and the logics perspective can be 
seen to intersect in various ways. Rhetoric is important for explaining how actors induce 
others to accept favored courses of action (Jarzabkowski et al. 2010; Erkama and Vaara 
2010) and these forms of argument have been valuable in explaining how the values and 
practices of logics are justified and established (Brown et al. 2012; Kaplan 2008). The 
appeal of central kinds of rhetorical argument often coincides with the values that define 
commonly-held logics (Green et al. 2008) while both also emphasize ‘macro-to-micro’ 
linkages or how wider belief systems influence local situations. Professional groups in 
particular serve as preeminent examples of bodies that operate across many of these 
areas, transferring collective powers to situations on the ground (Goodrick and Reay 
2011; Scott 2008) and employing strategic forms of persuasion to negotiate tensions 
between different groups, mediated by different logics (Currie et al. 2012).  
 Our specific focus is on contexts where multiple logics and the groups associated 
with them interact. In the institutional approach generally, though early work tended to 
focus on facilitating processes and the reinforcement of central positions, research 
attention has increasingly taken account of organizational fields where people experience 
competing demands and the requirement to negotiate a terrain defined by separate and 
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potentially conflicting logics (Andersson and Liff 2018; Fincham and Forbes 2015; 
Greenwood et al. 2011; Nicolini et al. 2016). What is often stressed here is the efficacy of 
the organizational work expended in ‘forms of cultural claims-making’ in response to 
challenges (Bos-de Vos et al. 2019: 129). However, less is known about how groups 
actually fight for organizational position and the means by which they defend the 
occupational identities and priorities encoded in logics. Some researchers in this area 
have drawn attention to more adversarial settings, focusing on how actors’ logics are 
asserted through language forms. Where jurisdictions overlap interaction between logics 
often occurs via polarized encounters and ‘intense efforts by actors to assert their point of 
view’ (Jarzabkowski et al. 2010: 222). In such situations rhetoric can provide the means 
to defy adverse demands and adapt groups’ interests (Bednarek et al. 2017; Erkama and 
Vaara 2010). Others have explored forms of argument that creatively exploit the tensions 
of opposition and that, for example, reflect the negative strategies of antagonists, and the 
weaving together of positive and negative themes (Riaz et al. 2016; Ruebottom 2013; 
Symon 2005). However, many of these still tend to be partial accounts, often the end 
point rather than the beginning of analysis and generally underspecifying different 
language forms involved. 
 In this context, we attempt to build on extant literature and address the theory gap 
by focusing more explicitly on counter-rhetoric, or the rhetorical forms that oppose 
others’ claims. This approach serves to foreground exchanges that define these often-
contested settings and to explore the role of oppositional strategies in intensifying an 
overall discourse. These include strategies aimed at delegitimizing a rival that are 
developed alongside a group’s own legitimacy claims; it also includes strategies that feed 
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directly on others’ rhetorical claims, sometimes even turning their values against them. 
We derive this approach partly from theoretical considerations based on extant literature 
but also in part as an emergent factor from a case study of a local mental health service. 
Mental health is an area where judgments about appropriate practice can be problematic 
given the risks attached to treating sensitive conditions in the community. It is also an 
area that is far from being institutionally unified; health itself is renowned as a ‘mixed’ 
field (Denis et al. 2013) and mental health perhaps even more a focus of competing 
professions (Abbott 1988).  
 In the service we studied, various medical and community groups were required 
to work together. Each had concerns around professional standing, occupational identity 
and responsibilities to patients, although groups broadly aligned with distinctive logics of 
‘health’ and ‘care’. The former asserted the primacy of medical expertise, the 
management of risk and treatment of sensitive conditions in confidence – the latter a set 
of priorities about engaging with service users’ wider problems, sharing information and 
modifying risk to facilitate recovery. Service integration intended to usher in joint 
working was thus defined by clashing inter-group logics associated with which was a 
range of complex uses of language. For example, creating images of others designed to 
exclude them from professional spheres was a clear strategy. But staff also anticipated 
criticism – mimicking critiques others may make, and reframing criticism in order to 
prepare the ground for denials. In explaining uses like these we propose that rhetoric 
takes on new and distinctive forms; it becomes reflexive and reactive and is continually 
framed by responses to others’ rhetoric. 
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 We focus on two research questions concerned with how groups use counter-
argument in a multiple context. First, as rhetoric defines a given field, how do logics 
reframe other logics and incorporate these images and animate and intensify them? This 
approach focuses on how logics are adapted within rhetorical exchanges and provides a 
dynamic and critical view that complements the more usual emphasis on logics as forms 
of simple institutional prescription (e.g. Nicolini et al. 2012; Thornton et al. 2012). 
Secondly we further highlight the implications for inter-group and inter-logic conflict. 
Where logics are asserted through counter-rhetoric and evolve as mutually-defining 
systems, we explore how these counter-images and constructs of other logics remain 
sources of conflict, even where organizations are coping at some level with incompatible 
demands. This extends studies of multiple fields that describe various institutional 
arrangements but underspecify how interactions actually take place (e.g. Greenwood et 
al. 2011; Suddaby and Greenwood 2005). 
 
LOGICS AND RHETORIC 
Institutional logics represent values that groups and individuals invest in relationships 
and that ‘underpin actors’ frameworks for reason and belief’ (Suddaby and Greenwood 
2005: 35). Logics are thus core elements of any institutional environment – serving as 
guides to sense making or scripts available to reduce wider uncertainties (Thornton et al. 
2012). However, the logics perspective is not purely or even mainly about field 
coherence, but about the dynamics of pluralist fields conceived in terms of multi-logic 
groups and contending forces in play (Bos-de Vos et al. 2019; Green et al. 2008). Such 
diversity reflects the fragmentary nature of many organizational fields and the separate 
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systems of value and reasoning they embrace (Hartman and Cosler 2019; Fincham and 
Forbes 2015). For example, the levels of disparity between logics, where they diverge 
across their whole range and interests are specific and unambiguous, have shown the 
limits of actors’ discretion in reconciling conflict (Greenwood et al. 2011: 332). These 
dynamics are linked to organizational skills including the use of language-based means 
such as rhetoric.   
 The focus on rhetoric and the groups who use it explains how logics that permeate 
a field transpose into language and are knowable across individuals and time. Logics are 
invoked through terminologies and vocabularies which define their boundaries but which 
are not just simple codes for describing expert concepts and practices, but a central ‘basis 
for forming systems of meaning’ (Loewenstein 2014: 67; also Loewenstein et al. 2012). 
Within collective groups such as professions, vocabularies are key means through which 
logics are maintained and defended, becoming important mechanisms in explaining how 
changes emerge. Rhetoric in particular denotes distinctive speech acts that supply 
guarantees through the production of evidence; as such, rhetoric has been viewed as ‘a 
total system of persuasion, reinforcement and reassurance’ (Carter and Jackson 2004: 
470) and a mainstay of broader discourses. For example, Suddaby and Greenwood (2005: 
35) posit a model that links institutional logics as structures that sit between purposeful 
rhetoric and outcomes in organizational change: ‘the strategic use of persuasive language, 
or rhetoric, is the means by which shifts in institutional logics are secured’, and which 
then ‘function to attach or deny legitimacy to new organizational forms’.  
 This approach is also usefully informed by discussion of professional powers and 
practices. Here Scott’s (2008) seminal account first identified expert occupations as 
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important agents of institutional change and, in particular, focused on each group’s 
‘distinctive institutional logic’ (Scott 2008: 232) as a defining feature governing conduct 
in an area of work. Others building on this analysis stressed the affinities between 
professional and institutional projects which are developed and adapted in much the same 
ways (Suddaby and Viale 2011); in particular, they have explored in detail the means 
professional forces employ to create institutional and organizational changes (Muzio, 
Brock and Suddaby 2013). Here Muzio and Kirkpatrick (2011) identify the professions’ 
central aim to expand or preserve control over work in specific organizational sites which 
 
 ‘inevitably involves jurisdictional disputes and negotiations with other 
 professions and aspiring occupations equipped with alternative forms of cultural 
 capital and rhetorical claims to expertise’ (Muzio and Kirkpatrick 2011: 332). 
 
Others similarly focus on rhetorical strategies used in interactions between the logics 
traditional in many professions and other logics that may invade workplaces. For 
example, Currie et al. (2012) found examples of medical elites who preserved their 
organizational position and status by successfully defining risk as the field central 
problem. These groups were able to conceptualize their expertise as the guarantee of safe 
practice, and define worst-case scenarios only they were able to manage.  
 Different rhetorical styles define what makes an argument persuasive. Classic 
Aristotelian rhetoric highlights universal types of appeal that explain how appropriate 
action is supported. These include the rational use of evidence (logos), an appeal to 
ethical and communal values (ethos) and an appeal rooted in emotion and experience 
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(pathos) (Brown et al 2012; Erkama and Vaara 2010). Other styles of rhetoric are 
available in interaction and include devices such as the transcendence of contrary 
arguments (Bednarek et al. 2017; Whittle et al. 2008), alignment of the macro with the 
local, and the defining of problems to which one can supply solutions (Brown et al. 2012; 
Erkama and Vaara 2010). Almost invariably in real-life contexts actors will, more or less 
skilfully, draw on and mix up various of these strategies, and use language to trim and 
modify logics in order to make appeals more compatible. For example, Hartman and 
Cosler (2019) investigated the ‘persuasive messaging’ employed in the field of human 
egg donation. These researchers found opposed altruistic and instrumental logics in the 
appeals to donors to help infertile couples. This rather surprising mix was nevertheless 
blended and was bolstered by other rhetorical approaches, such as the use of formal 
medical terminology in a skilful ‘layering of multiple logics’.  
 Despite this emphasis, however, power effects are not unconstrained. Strategies 
typically create congruence out of opinions that may be disparate but are still signed up to 
central values – for example, showing how actors cultivate groups from which 
compliance is sought (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001; Sillince and Brown 2009), or how 
they create and disseminate viable identities (Brown et al. 2012). Contested contexts are 
potentially different again and apply further constraint; here who is being persuaded is 
less certain, and indeed, some actors (notably an antagonist) may be almost impervious to 
persuasion. Nevertheless, researchers still emphasize rhetoric in changed circumstances 
albeit in terms of more assertive or deliberative means (Jarzabkowski et al. 2010). These 
approaches recognize that rhetoric is partly about creating credible arguments to exclude 
others. But these forms tend to construct the interests of rivals as an exogenous genre, or 
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take context for granted and play down how systems of reasoning develop and interact. 
We seek to build on these insights by specifying types of counter-argument that 
systematically exploit the ways in which groups reference some opposite or other.  
 Firstly basic legitimizing rhetoric supports the core values and narratives that 
unite groups; here a similarity of concerns enables actors to ‘persuade themselves and 
others that they share important qualities, values, and interests’ (Whittle et al. 2008: 103). 
However, also advantageous are forms of ‘dissociation’ (Golant et al. 2015) that unite 
speaker and audience by distancing them together from some other; these are claims 
about competence and judgment that are framed by the deficiencies of logics that others 
adopt. Researchers have sometimes laid greater emphasis on justifying rhetoric – the 
creation of positive self-images being seen as actors’ first preference while reframing the 
images of others is secondary (Kaplan 2008: 741). But the evidence for this is mixed. 
Groups may even prefer negative constructs to ‘success stories’ as the former allow them 
to avoid artless claims to status (Fincham 2002). Depending on who they implicate, 
failure stories can be oddly persuasive. For example, Riaz et al. (2016) describe how 
bankers responded to threats to their authority in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-
8. They made the expected claims to trustworthiness and expertise but did not try to 
absolve themselves from blame (which in the circumstances of a banking crash might 
lack credibility) but preferred to deflect blame and lower estimates of others’ abilities. 
 Accounts that distance the self from failures assigned to others, moreover, can 
also be used in combination with justifying rhetoric. The ‘coupling’ of arguments sets up 
comparisons through which claims gain in effectiveness. Here Sillince and Brown (2009) 
refer to a rhetorical strategy of ‘paired oppositions’; also Ruebottom (2013) points out 
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how sympathetic and differential rhetoric bring primal themes into play and allow ‘a 
more connotative and evocative use of language’ (Ruebottom, 2013: 113). Combining 
arguments can also be a vehicle for implicit content. As Fairclough (1995: 5) notes this 
works through a process of ‘presupposition’, the unspoken part being supplied by the 
audience such that its credibility is taken for granted.  
Finally certain claims and kinds of argument themselves contain the seeds of 
opposition (Kaplan 2008: 738; Symon 2005: 1646). This assumes that behind any logic 
there are values perceived as appropriate in a given context but too much of any one 
becomes inappropriate. As an example consider the possession of expertise; usually a 
powerful legitimizer, this can be turned on its head and rather than challenge someone’s 
standing as an expert the value of expertise itself can be be called into question (it can be 
defined as impersonal or overbearing). In this sense, counter-rhetoric trades on the 
obverse reaction that the assertion of great powers or virtues breeds. Each of the above 
arguments also draws on complex kinds of ‘intertextuality’ (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 
262) where statements are linked together and others’ assertions and claims (or 
refinements of them) are brought into arguments. In contested situations there are likely 
to be many more opportunities to refine and subvert others’ values in this way.  
 
FIELD LOGICS 
Our research site was as already indicated a mental health service. Located in central 
Scotland this had been designed as an ‘integrated service’ in response to policy changes 
at national level. In the UK, health provision tends to be equated with the free-at-the-
point-of-delivery National Health Service (NHS) but less intensive services are also 
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provided by Local Authorities or Councils. Integration of these areas – health and social 
care – has been on and off the policy agenda for many years, but while pockets of good 
practice do exist hoped-for improvements have rarely been achieved. This has earned 
integrated care the soubriquet of a troubled relationship recurring throughout repeated 
cycles of policy (Cameron 2015; Toth 2010). A policy push from the Scottish 
Government sought to readdress these problems; instead of ‘service silos’ that pass 
patients from one provider to another the aim was to ‘work with a shared understanding 
of needs and… a greater emphasis on systems of care’ (Scottish Executive 2003: 38). Our 
case was just such an attempt at service integration in one Council region. NHS day care 
in psychiatry, psychology, occupational therapy and mental-health nursing was 
reorganized with Council teams in community mental health and community access. 
These groups had worked with a looser awareness of each other but new norms required 
a more unified workplace. Crucially too, the changes brought institutional logics of 
‘health’ and ‘care’ closer together.  
 These were in effect field-level examples of the meta-logics of professionalism 
and community (Scott 2008; Thornton et al. 2012) and are well-documented as ways of 
defining practice (Dunn and Jones 2010). The so-called medical model views mental 
problems like any other illness; diagnosis is carried out by a doctor (general practitioner 
or psychiatrist) and treated through clinical intervention, often involving medication. The 
care model emphasizes social/environmental causes of illness such as domestic violence, 
addiction and housing, while therapies are administered by workers trained in 
complementary techniques (Beresford 2002; Roberts and Wolfson 2004). These models 
were embedded in logics of health and care and, as with all logics encapsulated core 
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values, authorizing narratives and existing practices, all homed in specific groups. The 
health logic enshrined as it was in professional powers was legitimized via knowledge of 
physical causes and its associated group was NHS practitioners. The logic of care saw 
good outcomes achieved by normalizing mental health and treating the ‘whole person’ 
while the home group was care workers. These can be seen simply as ‘alternative 
philosophies’ (Beresford 2002: 582) but when co-present there is considerable potential 
for conflict. Medical skill, welcome in cases of serious need, may be said to lack social 
understanding (which can be supplied through holistic care); or the claim to bring holistic 
benefits may impede the control of risk (the specialty of medical experts).  
 Our study identified two further critical interfaces between logics. Here rhetorical 
attack and counter attack were couched in discourses that related to core problems of the 
area. The first of these was around the sharing of information, and the second was around 
the so-called recovery agenda. 
 
Patient confidentiality vs. information sharing 
Policy thinking has long averred cultures of information sharing to be essential for joint 
working, although in a health context the information in question is patients’ records 
which remain highly sensitive. Policy-makers are therefore equally clear about the need 
‘to reassure service users that personal information will be treated sensitively and stored 
securely’ (Scottish Executive 2000: 25). This was a dilemma that reverberated within the 
integrated service. While a ‘seamless service’ was a priority, the sharing of patient data 
directly confronted NHS ethics of confidentiality; conflicts were thus felt both by groups 
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who felt pressed by inappropriate demands for data and those for whom just demands 
were not being met.  
 
Risk vs. recovery 
Logics were also differentiated by perceptions of medical risk. Here it has long been a 
criticism of psychiatric theory that it harbours views of maintenance and decline in the 
progression of illness, and places undue stress on the risks attached to chronic conditions 
and the inevitability of poor outcomes for most people (Lester and Gask 2006). The 
response has been a more reassuring emphasis on ‘recovery’. Themes here allow for a 
more relaxed view of quality of life, even if this means accepting a higher risk of relapse 
(Bonney and Stickley 2008). However, these remain very much open questions and 
psychiatry has never accepted this critique as anything more than a ‘caricature’ of its 
profession (Roberts and Wolfson 2004: 45). In any event, these wider debates were at 
least partly consolidated on the ground; for health professionals symptoms were often 
signs of worsening conditions, whereas re-engagement with normal life proved central to 
the care logic.  
 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
Our analysis of language use relied on interviews with service members. As key data 
sources, these lent themselves to a qualitative and interpretive approach well suited to 
exploring discursive constructs such as institutional logics and helped to show how 
rhetoric framed the values and narratives that comprised logics. At the time of the 
research the service numbered around 45-50 staff of which a total of 22 were 
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interviewed. The main professional groups were constituted as follows: there were five 
service managers (from this group the number interviewed, n=5), an elite group of four 
consultant psychiatrists and psychologists (here n=3), 12 mental health nurses (n=3), four 
occupational therapists (n=3), six community access workers (n=4) and seven community 
mental health workers (n=4).   
 The large majority of the participant group (19 out of 22) were female reflecting 
the demographic details of the service as a whole and groups such as nurses, community 
workers and occupational therapists in particular. Interviews were conducted face-to-
face, lasting between 40 minutes and one-and-a-half hours and generating in excess of 
350 pages of single-spaced transcript. They followed a schedule of thematic questions 
focused on respondents’ experiences of change within the network of inter-professional 
relations; these included the different images of healthcare and how these were 
communicated among groups in the field, the effects of working arrangements on group 
relations, and how workplace integration was supported or resisted. The co-authors 
conducted all interviews jointly, and compared and discussed the generated data items 
until a shared understanding was reached, in order to ensure the links between quoted 
materials and their interpretation were likely to be stable.  
 The analysis was guided by a number of theory-data links. In describing logics, 
certain well-known and well-reported settings are known to constitute ‘grand institutional 
regimes’ (Meyer et al. 2014: 867) and provide links to professional backgrounds. In our 
case these helped in identifying the field logics and provided a starting point for defining, 
separating and exploring analytic dimensions. But the process of assigning data items and 
extracts to aggregate dimensions needed to take account of other factors; as well as 
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legitimating accounts that supported a given logic there were attacks on others’ ways of 
working and attempts to deny attacks others might make. Sequences of assertions and 
counter-assertions (and even counters to the counters) were characteristic of the data, and 
they led to a search for different rhetorical elements within an emerging theory 
framework. This began by recognizing that while logics are partly inwardly facing, 
critiques of others’ claims were no less important. A further category reflected claims that 
were not asserted separately but were contrasted and juxtaposed in speech forms that 
simultaneously conveyed meanings. At the same time, assaults on others’ values 
represented a means of turning a perceived antagonist’s strengths into weaknesses, as 
well as framing one’s own values. These categories provided substantive descriptions of 
rhetorical forms and were the basis of an emerging pattern of connections between logics. 
They were used in conjunction with descriptions of respective logics in terms of their 
main narratives plus the twin discourses of information sharing and recovery identified 
earlier. 
    ____________________ 
     Table I 
    ____________________  
 
 Table 1 summarizes the analysis. The process we followed was adapted from the 
idea of a ‘signature matrix’ (Creed et al. 2002: 482) for describing institutional logics. 
Although designed for describing unique logics, the underlying approach of sorting idea 
elements into categories and highlighting inter-relations and unifying themes worked well 
in exploring a multiple organizational field, and provided a useful framework for 
describing how the health and care logics played off each other. This involved identifying 
examples that were assigned to separate categories of rhetoric and cross-referencing them 
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with the opposed narratives, combinations and counters. We thus sought to explore how 
groups presented their logic and others and their logic based on links between a logic and 
its associated group. Data items were arranged so that claims about any logic and 
arguments directed at another were voiced consistently from one group, and in this way 
clusters of data items defined the scope of the respective health and care logics. These 
categories form the basis of the discussion that follows.  
 
CATEGORIES OF RHETORIC 
Legitimizing accounts 
Groups’ interpretive work in support of their logics stood at the base of legitimacy 
claims. The basic authorizing narrative of the health logic relied on the practitioner’s role 
and on explicit images of professionalism. These emphasized expert knowledge and 
judgement and tended to be couched in a language of diagnosis, treatment and assessment 
and working within highly skilled teams. 
 
I don’t think by the very nature of psychological or psychiatric difficulties there is 
ever an easy answer but we have systems for managing that. We have a process 
that we follow, and within that we can manage the complexity, so there’s nothing 
about being able to see somebody and decide instantly what is wrong and what 
needs to happen. That sometimes happens but it is often an emerging process 
which is where the team helps that we review people.  (Consultant Psychologist 
#2) 
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However, the logic was not monolithic, and there could also be degrees of variation 
around the references to these norms. For example, this sometimes reflected a 
dispassionate, almost mundane focus on doing the job that could potentially emphasize 
the professional aspect even more, suggesting abilities that needed no further 
justification. 
 
 I’m the medical person obviously… and one of the things I’m paid for is having a 
 broad overview of mental health and all the different potential interventions. 
 (Consultant Psychiatrist #1) 
 
Or professional expertise could also be filtered through values that were in some respects 
in tension with an overly medical approach. 
 
 Maybe this is something to do with psychology but I tend to avoid kind of 
 medical terminology. I don’t really talk about pathology or diagnosis even. I 
 don’t work that way. In fact a lot of the time probably the way I would speak 
 would be more in terms of the social aspect. Yeah, I mean that’s one part of the 
 role is to bring that kind of perspective, as well, and to work alongside you know 
 the medical profession.  (Consultant Psychologist #3) 
 
Nevertheless, their role in coping with the uncertainties surrounding cases and as 
managers of risk was central to the health groups’ claims. Concepts of medical risk (or 
the chances of lapsing into a severe condition) were bolstered by references to the 
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inherently complex nature of the work, or to difficult cases and reminders that any check 
in a patient’s progress may mean a referral back to psychiatric services: ‘…if anything 
gets too tricky for people they refer it to [us]’ (Occupational Therapist #2). 
 Claims associated with the care logic struck a very different note. These reflected 
distinctive but overlapping care principles including the commitment to a holistic 
engagement and a return to family, friends and work (often amalgamated in references to 
treating the ‘whole person’). Other important principles included the normalization of 
people’s problems and social inclusion, which were frequently activated through the 
mechanism of the involvement of clients’ in services. 
  
 Well, I think for us here it’s kind of service user led, you know, people telling us 
 what they want. We have a huge service user impact in our working life or our 
 working day, all the time, because we get really good feedback. We ask for 
 feedback constantly after every group, after we see people we’re asking them 
 what they want, what was wrong with the hand-outs, what was wrong with this, 
 what was wrong with that. So that kind of shapes what we do.  (Community 
 Access worker #4) 
 
And while these arguments drew on underlying principles, they often boiled down to 
simpler issues of compassion, understanding and common-sense empathy, or simply 
‘how you treat people’. 
 
Delegitimizing accounts 
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Alongside these positive claims there also existed attacks on others’ logic. In defence of 
their logic, health professionals drew on criticisms of standards under siege and of those 
not trained to high standards. Ways of countering the care logic played on communal 
values as a by-word for well-meaning ineffectiveness, while the inclusiveness that care 
staff prided themselves on could become a lack of specialist skill.  
 
 There’s just this sense that someone comes in from the outside with a rather 
 mysterious agenda and it all looks like it’s going to be turned over to a bunch of 
 amateurs from the community. That would be a very unkind way of putting it, but 
 basically the [social care] people were very interchangeable and they could all do 
 each other’s jobs. (Consultant Psychiatrist #1) 
 
 For their part, care workers initiated corresponding attacks on health values. They 
openly advocated a ‘non-clinical approach’ and drew on vivid alternatives to the medical 
model. Medical know-how was defined as a kind of one-way street between practitioner 
and client, and there were constant references to the value of keeping people out of 
hospital (which was slightly disingenuous as NHS provision was supplied from a day 
centre), as well as direct attacks on the expertise myth of medicine. 
 
 …a general culture as far as mental health [is concerned] is that people in health 
 are the experts; they have got the expertise, they are the be-all and end-all of 
 mental health.  (Service Manager #4)  
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These conjured images of the overuse of knowledge and of power asymmetries invoked 
by expertise, and hence of unwanted divisions between providers and users. Here the 
macro-setting arguably took on extra significance. The stigma often attached to mental 
problems meant that clinical methods (‘giving people full psychiatric assessments’) were 
sometimes seen as unwarranted even by clinical groups. Indeed, the very term ‘medical’ 
has been seen as a way of labelling doctors and classifying conditions as problems 
suitable for treatment in unjustified ways (Beresford 2002). In this sense, references to 
‘the medical model’ and practitioner expertise generally, when spoken in certain contexts 
by certain groups represented an attack on professionalism.  
 
Coupled accounts 
These narratives were also paired so that simultaneous legitimating and de-legitimating 
accounts gathered strength and sharpened respective claims. In some respects, explicit 
examples of such rhetorical coupling may have only been the most conspicuous cases. 
Even where people seemed to be simply justifying their own values and practices they 
could be invoking implicit references. For example, care staff’s stress on ‘how you treat 
people’ represented an unspoken rebuke of expertise. Similarly, having command of 
medical interventions highlighted by health groups implied criticism of those whose 
knowledge wasn’t formalized. 
 Still, people were also practiced in making comparisons explicit. Health staff, for 
example, tended to define work identities through the professional hierarchy, and pitted 
their position at ‘the peak’ of a tiered service against others’ lay skills.    
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We provide the mental health services for [the region]. It’s how I see us, and I 
think we wouldn’t necessarily see that [care services] as a mental health problem. 
That’s why they’re separate. So, yeah, lots of people here feel lucky that we are 
who we are because we get on, we feel like we provide good service. We feel that 
we value each other, but I’m not too sure we bother about the tiers below us.  
(Consultant Psychologist #2) 
 
On the care side, clinical values came under fire, for example, through highlighting the 
gulf between a rule-driven medical approach and a less restrictive culture of care.   
 
[With NHS services] it was, we will take you there, we will make sure you do 
this, we’ll make sure you do that, instead of giving the people freedom of choice. 
But with the social side they were more looking at the person as a whole, if they 
had a housing issue, if they had this issue, if they had that issue that was getting 
dealt with. These things got in the way, and that person wasn’t allowed to move 
forward, whereas it didn’t matter with the NHS, we’ll treat the illness; we’ll get 
you through, whereas the person couldn’t really do that because the other things 
were fuelling the fire.  (Community Access Worker #1)  
 
 This type of usage involved quick-fire comparisons and a switching back and 
forth of ideas, a process assisted by rhetorical strategies of ‘compression’ that seemed 
emergent and characteristic in participants’ responses. The definitive forms of these often 
came down to individual terms which served almost as keywords that were freighted with 
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meaning and brought specific values and practices into play. Terms that stood for a 
medical approach such as ‘patient’, ‘symptom’, and ‘treatment’ were deemed to be 
exclusionary by care workers, while their priorities of ‘community’, ‘inclusion’ and 
‘involvement’ could signal unprofessionalism to health staff. Condensed language forms 
supported a range of simple but powerful comparisons. Examples included paired claims 
designed to stress the importance of managing risk: ‘If they go there [social services] and 
they’re too unwell, then they need to come back up here.’ (Occupational Therapist #1). 
Equivalent assertions in support of the care logic, for instance, elicited worries about 
giving people medical labels: ‘We don’t talk about patients; they do.’ (Service Manager 
#4). Or again, comparisons that paired the care logic with supposed negative outcomes of 
risk: ‘[We should] talk about wellness rather than illness.’ (Service Manager #3). In these 
examples, assertions seemed to be compounded so that individual claims bracketed each 
other, stabilizing the overall claim and appearing more credible.   
 
INFORMATION DISCOURSE 
A key area of divergence between logics related to the sharing of sensitive information 
and the rhetorical claims associated with this central discourse. Specifically, health 
groups invoked worries about patient data being ‘passed from different parts of the 
service’ positioning themselves as safe-guarders of this relationship: ‘Confidentiality’s 
something that is drummed into you the minute you decide to become a nurse’ 
(Community Practice Nurse #2). But while being grounded in patient ethics, it seemed 
clear these claims were also about preserving professional interests. Medical histories 
were generated from health-group assessments, and patient files formed a tangible 
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symbol of expertise, so allowing this information to circulate in unfiltered form would 
have meant sharing hard-won knowledge. 
 In contrast, the approach that care staff embraced was much more consistent with 
the give-and-take of client data. Here justification arose partly through a quite different 
interpretation of data, one that saw it as a common good and something that was actually 
appropriate to share for the benefit of all, clients included. Thus obtaining information on 
clients, particularly detailed clinical data was deemed beneficial and matched by a 
willingness to pass back any information that would make other’s jobs easier. But (as 
with health) there were also underlying processes at work that derived from professional 
contexts. Data sharing on the care side implied the involvement of a range of providers 
and agencies in decisions on individual cases. Essentially a stakeholder model based on 
the managed dissemination of case files, this was embedded in practices established 
throughout social care. Attitudes were thus supporting patterns that care staff were 
familiar with and had links to wider institutional bases. 
 
 We’ve worked now with quite a lot of clients and we liaise with each other as 
 well, so if we’re working, you know, we’re both working with the client or 
 working in partnership with other people, it’s important that we do have that 
 connection where we all know what each other’s doing.  (Community Access 
 Worker #2) 
 
 Counter-arguments in this area also made use of strategies of ‘expansion’ into 
stories and anecdotes that facilitated the communication of claims. In the case of health 
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staff they shrewdly framed the disclosure of information in terms of its sensitivity (their 
strong suite) and the likely histories of people with mental issues. In particular, they 
challenged access to full client data by means of a distinctive ‘need to know’ counter. 
Thus allusion to a readily identifiable approach to restricting sensitive information 
effectively turned the claim for free data sharing on its head. This particular story was 
widely taken up by health staff and wove together a number of threads: what information 
was strictly needed outside professional circles and what were the motives of those who 
wanted access to data they were not trained to assess?  
 
 The problem is that people are coming to a psychiatric assessment and sharing 
 lots of information about them [clients]. And all of us here don’t think lots of 
 people need to know that, you know. So our question was why do they [social 
 care] need to know that? If they’re dealing with a mild issue, with a presenting 
 problem and we’ve assessed them and they just need this wee bit of information, 
 what are they going to do with that other information rather than just know it? 
 (Occupational Therapist #1)                  
 
The reverse claim from care staff reflected another widely circulated story, one that 
effectively attacked health’s Achilles heel of risk-averse practices. This homed in on the 
experiences service users were purported to have in dealing with the NHS’s statutory 
system. Users were pictured being ‘fed up’ with having to repeat their story and keen to 
have their details passed on in the system – the result of being beset by form-filling and 
of having to go back to square one to have their case histories re-checked. 
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 I don’t know if you’ve ever gone to the GP and been referred, you know, to a 
 clinic and then on to somebody else, and they ask you the same questions about 
 twenty times. Now if you’re patient, that’s fine. If you’re, you know, struggling 
 with your mental health, or you’re an elderly person, that’s very frustrating  
 (Community Mental Health Worker #2) 
 
 These two stories neatly thus framed quandaries about who should be the arbiters 
of information. They appealed to powerful sources of legitimacy in user interests and 
linked different texts or refinements of statements in various ways (such as putting words 
into others’ mouths, or placing a text inside a text). They represented classic counter-
rhetoric, being less about disputing a claim than challenging the whole basis on which a 
claim was made.  
 
RISK/RECOVERY DISCOURSE 
Professional concerns also played out in the conflicts between medical risk and recovery. 
We noted above how professional debates have shaped competing truths about the nature 
of progression in illness, and these were issues that were consolidated on the ground in 
our case. The dominant claims from health were based on presenting themselves as 
guarantors of safe practice and playing up the risks of illness progressing. 
 
 The opportunities for receiving care at different levels are better, where you might 
 be experiencing a mild kind of mental health problem, but we know that the kind 
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 of research that’s done into health is that folk at that stage are folk that are likely 
 to develop more moderate then severe and more complex social issues and 
 everything else. So the ability to intervene at an early stage is better, I think. 
 (Community Practice Nurse #1)   
 
In contrasting claims, care teams entertained no doubts about recovery norms and owned 
these ideas very effectively. The priorities of a return to social networks and rebuilding 
individuals’ confidence were fully in accord with their logic and were articulated in a 
simple, practical language that itself spoke of empathy with service users’ wants and 
needs. 
 
 …we’ve got a great story from somebody who’s used the services and been able 
 to link into a whole package of support that has brought him from a very bad 
 place to, you know, really quite a good place.  (Community Mental Health 
 Worker #1) 
 
Counter-arguments to each of these constituent claims played as before on respective 
strengths and weaknesses. Social care teams cautioned against too much reliance on elite 
expertise, slowing down service users from being able to restart their lives, while the 
matching counter from health alluded to chances of relapse.  
However, there were some interesting and significant differences between the two 
main discourses of information and recovery. Unlike other areas, attitudes seemed to be 
more blurred within the recovery discourse and to accommodate more common ground. 
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As well as being impelled towards risk-averse roles, health groups themselves made 
some progressive claims while a basic ‘language of recovery’ was something all 
subscribed to. These differences were detectable at the rhetorical level. Even though it 
was in theory possible to conceive of claims about the risks to patients who had moved 
on to rehabilitative care, there seemed little evidence of any extensive circulation of 
myths and stories about the chances of relapse, which seemed to reflect a choice not to 
press rhetorical claims. Possibilities of patient relapse tended to be treated pragmatically, 
while for their part care workers conceded an ultimate reliance on psychiatric inputs. 
These understandings of mental health, which we explore further in the discussion, 
appeared to be conditioned by the sheer appeal of concepts of wellness that all groups in 
some contexts internalized.  
 
DISCUSSION 
The above account explored the systems of reasoning and belief, or logics associated with 
groups of mental-health professionals. In an institutionally diverse setting logics were 
asserted through rhetorical claim and counter-claim, both generated locally and imported 
from wider systems of meaning. Logic based on the safe treatment of illness identified 
health groups as custodians of this code, while a logic of helping people regain normality 
served to stake the care groups’ claims. In addition, our analysis specified a number of 
often complementary counter-rhetorical strategies. Based on contested logics, counter-
arguments that disowned others’ values and denied their practices were worthy of wider 
adoption were key elements of both systems. Delegitimizing accounts (negative labelling, 
failure stories) aimed at a rival’s values were no less important than arguments that 
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supported a group’s own claims. Further opportunities for combining with justifying 
rhetoric produced arguments that were ‘compounded’ and gained in coherence and 
credibility; these were facilitated by themes being compressed and crystallized in local 
cultural accounts. And counter-rhetoric was also sometimes based on the ‘conversion’ of 
other groups’ central values into negatively-assessed qualities. Here forms of argument 
were communicated though expansion into stories and thematic narratives often 
reflecting great ingenuity in devising persuasive claims.  
 Our research questions focused, firstly, on implications of the analysis for the 
scope and significance of logics. Prior research identifies various ways in which 
competing institutional logics are not confined solely to the legitimacy claims encoded in 
them but may ‘creatively iterate’ (Bevort and Suddaby 2016: 20) with oppositional logics 
in order to adapt to new institutional pressures, or may embrace strategic ideas from 
another logic in other forms of ‘divergence from the home logic’ (Andersson and Liff 
2018). Our findings further suggested that refined images of other logics, identities and 
frames may also be embraced; thus in contested situations logics were partly defined by 
their opposites and by powerful sets of contra-identities and forms of counter-argument. 
Logics grounded in rhetorical forms thus encompassed central problems of the field and 
were embedded at fundamental levels of knowledge, critical for how practitioners 
understood their roles. For example, issues around medical data reflected arguments that 
powerfully asserted cases both for the hoarding of information and information sharing, 
while issues of risk-versus-recovery centred on dilemmas about the progression of illness 
(whether ill people normally got worse or got better).  
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 Secondly, while studies have shown how multiple organizational fields embrace 
rival work practices (Greenwood et al. 2011) we advanced further reasons why they 
remained sources of enduring conflict. Where logics were asserted through counter-
rhetoric, adversarial attitudes became integral to any given logic and not relinquished 
without giving up part of the logic associated with one’s own identity. Relations between 
groups were also defined to a significant degree by processes of mutual definition; 
processes of reframing and refining others’ claim drew logics into tightly connected or 
interlocking sets of values, narratives and practices. These effectively formed the separate 
poles of distinctive ‘dialogical’ discourses (Symon 2005: 1646) and a system of logics 
that constrained any ability to reform cultural differences.  
 We sought to develop these insights as a framework of related strategies, but there 
is no claim this was an overarching framework that excluded other rhetorical styles. The 
health logic, for example, can readily be seen to reflect logos-type values of evidence and 
assessment; equally the care logic it vied with was defined by ethos-type communal 
values, and both overlapped with pathos and a passionate commitment for and against 
logics. Analysis could have also focused on language devices. Transcendence, for 
instance, was a common claim: medical logic held that diagnosable conditions provided 
an ‘overview’ of mental health while the ‘normalizing’ of people’s problems served 
much the same function for social care. Similarly, there were degrees of variability that 
could be observed in the patterns of action and reaction between logics. Not all pressures 
from wider structures were reproduced locally and nor was rhetoric always fashioned out 
of available tools. Language forms in this sense presented ‘a system of options’ 
(Fairclough 1995: 5) to be adapted for a given situation.  
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 Amid a contested environment for health and care this variability was valuable in 
suggesting areas of accommodation that were able to co-exist with conflict. Perhaps the 
main example involved the risks around relapse; although there seemed to be a potential 
for rhetorical narratives to evolve here, these issues were treated pragmatically on the 
whole. Thus the sharing of patient data was never wholly accepted (certainly clinical files 
were never circulated) but issues around risk-versus-recovery proved less of a flash point. 
Corresponding to these differences, our findings indicated the hoarding and sharing of 
data both being supported through well-circulated narratives, but medical risk elicited 
much less of this kind of support. In explaining these differences factors that reduce 
disparities between logics are useful (Greenwood et al. 2011: 332). Here prior evidence 
suggests where medical groups dominate a professional field they frequently claim to be 
able to manage both risk and recovery (Dunn and Jones 2010), and these ideas locally 
may have helped in reducing disparities and resetting group boundaries.  
 Such partial transitions carried implications for research and practice and suggest 
areas where managerial efforts to create joint outcomes might be concentrated. Thus 
Nicolini et al. (2016: 242) suggest that more stable arrangements between logics, at field 
level, are attainable wherever a broader ‘institutional landscape’ is aligned and 
supportive. Similarly, these processes were akin to what Carter and Mueller (2002: 1350) 
have termed an ‘internal critique’ to facilitate dialogue and the retaining of valuable 
perspectives. Unlike in a more medically-oriented model, the integrated service supported 
a range of approaches to understanding and treating mental health, which is a field where 
few universal methods exist. Given the problems associated with healthcare integration 
any such gains seem all the more impressive. 
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CONCLUSION 
Cases of polarized relations have been seen to ‘heighten the visibility’ (Kaplan 2008: 
732) of efforts to maintain systems of values and practices. Our focus on language use 
helped in exploring the conflicts integral to an organizational field and the connections to 
wider institutional forces. We specified a number of distinctive forms of counter-rhetoric 
which enabled groups to deal with opposing institutional work and fight their corner in a 
contested setting. Taken together these strategies differed from rhetoric more typically 
directed at a potentially receptive ‘audience’. Groups were hardly audiences for each 
other in the case explored here, while intentionality was more often internally directed. 
This was more about maintaining boundaries and arguments being ‘fed back’ in order to 
enrol colleagues and retain enthusiasm for the work, rather than merely preaching to the 
converted. Even though logics dictated very different interpretations of how outcomes 
should be achieved, they were still mediated through goals of good outcomes for service 
users and under specific conditions requirements to work jointly were accommodated. 
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Table 1.  Signature matrix of health and care logics 
Rhetorical categories Health logic constructs Care logic constructs 
Core legitimizing and 
delegitimizing 
accounts 
Basis of legitimacy claim: 
The practitioner’s role and application of a 
professional knowledge base. An expert 
logic, this stresses models of diagnosis, 
assessment and treatment and the role of 
managers of risk of last resort 
 
Counter-rhetoric: 
Critique of the care model as being 
unprofessional and its practitioners as having 
little real expertise 
Basis of legitimacy claim: 
The normalization of people’s problems. A 
holistic logic, this stresses  
social/environmental causes of illness and 
treating the ‘whole person’ 
 
 
Counter-rhetoric: 
Critique of the narrow focus of medical 
expertise. An expert monopoly of knowledge 
has negative consequences for wellbeing 
Patient confidentiality 
vs. information sharing 
Basis of legitimacy claim: 
Retaining patient data within a tight 
professional circle (information hoarding) 
guarantees the confidentiality of personal 
medical histories and trust in the practitioner 
 
Counter-rhetoric: 
Patient consent is undermined by models of 
care in which their personal data circulates. 
Less qualified staff have a limited ‘need to 
know’ 
Basis of legitimacy claim: 
Information sharing is the basis of improved 
care and decisions about treatment. Also an 
essential ingredient of integrated working 
 
 
 
Counter-rhetoric: 
Within medical bureaucracies, clients 
become ‘fed up’ with having to continually 
repeat their case histories 
Risk vs. recovery Basis of legitimacy claim: 
The importance of medical intervention in 
order to minimize risk of relapse. Symptoms 
are regarded as early signs of more severe 
and enduring conditions 
 
Counter-rhetoric: 
Patients who have moved on to rehabilitative 
care remain at risk of relapse 
Basis of legitimacy claim: 
Images of mental health that stress the 
normality of recovery. Emphasis on therapies 
that provide for the consolidation of gains 
and links to family, community and work 
 
Counter-rhetoric: 
Clients condemned to dependency on 
medical experts preventing people from 
moving on with their lives 
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